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Introduction
Between 1955and1958,thefederal housing programs played a highly
important and controversial role in the conduct of economic stabilization
policies. The amount of resources available to the housing sector was influ-
enced by many administrative actions of government agencies as well as by
the usual annual changes in housing legislation. The frequency and scope
of these actions exceeded anything experienced previously, except in times
of war.
Federal credit programs in the housing sector were placed under restraints
in 1955, when the economy was moving forward in an exuberant expansion.
The imposition of selective controls on government-underwritten mortgages
raised crucial questions typically associated with qualitative credit regula-
tions. Was housing singled out for especially severe treatment and, if so, why?
Did the restraints serve to correct specific maladjustments in the housing
and mortgage markets or to supplement and perhaps reinforce general credit
restraints, or both? Did they have effects over and above the checks provided
by tightening financial markets and restrictive monetary measures?
Later, in a reversal of the 1955 policy, some of the federal housing pro-
grams were mobilized in an effort to moderate the decline in residential
construction, while general monetary restraints were continued and even
strengthened to contain the inflationary pressures on an economy operating
at high levels of activity. Was housing sheltered from the rationing of funds
in the capital market and the restraining policies of the monetary authori-
ties, and, if so, why? Did tightening credit have a disproportionate and
unduly severe impact in this sector of the economy? Did the relief given to
housing blunt significantly the effectiveness of the general program of credit
restraint?
Finally, the policies of 1956and1957, intended to cushion the downward
movement of home building in the midst of general economic prosperity,
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merged into measures designed to stimulate residential construction as an
antidote to the general economic recession that began in the latter part of
1957.
ReconcilingDisparate National Objectives
Thus, the relation between federal housing credit policies and general
monetary and fiscal policies has been a matter of major continuous con-
cern in the discharge of the government's responsibility for helping maintain
economic stability and growth. This concern has resulted mainly from the
commitment of the federal government to two broad national objectives.
One is the government's pledge to promote stable prosperity, made specific
by the Employment Act of 1946 but also implied in the older mandate of
the Federal Reserve Act. The other is the advancement of better housing
through the federal aids enacted during the past generation. Broadly inter-
preted, these aids seek to confer on housing a preferential status in the use
of resources, especially in the use of funds, compared to the allocation that
would result from the free interaction of market forces. The "Declaration
of National Housing Policy" in the Housing Act of establishes as one
of the national housing objectives "the realization as soon as feasible of the
goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family"; and it requires, among other things, the administration of federal
housing programs "in such manner as will encourage and assist...the
stabilization of the housing industry at a high annual volume of residential
construction" (italics supplied).
While there may be sweet harmony between the two national objectives
in the long run, there can be conflict in the short run. The objective of
economic stability, for example, may call for restraints on federal housing
credit aids at times of high employment, rapid economic growth, and
potential inflationary pressures. The goals of better housing and stable per-
formance of residential construction may call for sustained federal support
regardless of any adverse impact on general economic stability.
From 1955 to 1957,thefederal officials responsible for the conduct of
stabilization policy were confronted with the delicate task of reconciling the
two disparate objectives.1 This essay seeks to examine the conditions under
which conflict arose, the ways in which it manifested itself, the manner in
which its reconciliation was attempted, and the extent to which this was
accomplished. To review the experience of 1955-1957seemsuseful for a
number of reasons. First, a record of that period should help improve future
The conflict between the two objectives ceased to exist in late 1957and1958,
when administrative and legislative measures to stimulate housing were taken as parts
of an anti-recession program. These developments are outside the purview of the
present paper.
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public policies when similar situations in the housing sector develop. Second,
federal credit programs generally have been growing rapidly, and the task
of administering them so as to strengthen the stability of the economy will
become increasingly important. These programs add a significant new dimen-
sion to fiscal policy, which to date has been confined to such matters as
direct federal expenditures, revenues, and debt management. Thus, the hous-
ing issues in economic stabilization policy foreshadow similar, even larger
problems to be met in the future, and the record of their resolution should
aid in a more systematic consideration of the proper role of all federal
credit programs in the conduct of our fiscal affairs. Third, the review, while
limited to housing, touches upon a number of important general questions
concerning economic stabilization policies. Among these are the relation be-
tween selective and general credit controls, the criteria for imposing selective
controls, the relative emphasis that stabilization policies may place on aggre-
gate stability or on the composition of total output, and the timing of policy
actions.
The period considered in this essay was not the first in which variations
in federal housing credit policies had a bearing on economic stability. In
1948-1949, for example, when a decline in home building was followed
by a general business recession, stepped-up mortgage purchases by the
Federal National Mortgage Association helped to stimulate residential con-
struction. Later, during the Korean War, the maximum permissible terms
for government-underwritten mortgage loans were tightened, various other
administrative measures were taken to curtail housing credit extended by
federal agencies, and even the terms on conventional real-estate loans (not
insured or guaranteed by the federal government) were controlled by
Regulation X under the authority of the Defense Production Act of i 950.
However, a peacetime policy of flexible management of the federal housing
credit programs in the interest of economic stability was clearly enunciated
only in recent years. Moreover, the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord of
1951, after the disruptions of the Korean episode, did not until recently
become fully effective in restoring the potentials of a flexible monetary
policy and in exposing problems in the relation between such a policy and
specific governmental actions affecting housing credit.
Although this essay focuses on the analysis of policies between 1955and
1957, it will first briefly discuss the expansion of residential construction
immediately before this period and examine the forces which produced that
expansion. Any maladjustments in the housing and mortgage markets that
the 1955restraintson housing credit may have sought to correct presumably
originated during the rapid advance in home building that began in late
1953.Moreover,the role of residential building in sustaining economic
activity during the recession of 1953-1954andin helping generate the sub-
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sequent recovery may have affected the timing of the restraints of 1955.
Finally,it was during the 1953-1954periodthat policies were formulated
to employ the federal housing credit programs with greater flexibility so as
to aid economic stabilization.
A major section of the report will deal with the application of selective
credit controls in the housing sector during 1955. That year witnessed the
first peacetime invocation of nation-wide restraints on the terms of govern-
ment-underwritten mortgage loans and, except for the brief episode of
consumer credit regulation from September 1948toJune 1949,thefirst
peacetime use of any selective credit controls other than margin require-
ments on loans for the purchase of securities. In addition, and again without
precedent in time of peace, restraints were imposed on certain kinds of
interim credit to mortgage lenders. The rationale for these actions, their
timing and effectiveness, and their relation to general monetary and fiscal
policies are worth examination.
The essay will also analyze the shift in housing credit policies during 1956
andifrom restraint to relief, which was intended to cushion the impact
of tightening financial markets on the housing sector. Not only were some
of the earlier restrictions relaxed, but positive steps were taken mainly
through massive purchases of mortgages by the Federal National Mortgage
Association, to help check the decline in the flow of funds into housing.
Moreover, seemingly incongruous measures were initiated to stimulate the
demand for housing. Here again, the rationale for these actions, their timing
and effectiveness, and their relation to the general monetary and fiscal
policies of the period bear scrutiny.
The final section will discuss some of the more fundamental issues sug-
gested by review of the policies pursued during the 1955-1957period.Is the
government justified in using its influence over housing credit in the interest
of economic stability, as well as for the promotion of better housing, or does
this mean using the housing sector as a "buffer" to help absorb the hard
knocks of business fluctuations? Can criteria be developed for determining
whether governmental effortsto prevent residential construction from
magnifying general business fluctuations interfere unduly with the attain-
ment of national housing objectives? Is ever-normal or ever-growing volume
of new building the only criterion of good housing policy? Does the greater
volatility of the government-underwritten sector of housing construction,
compared to fluctuations in the "conventional" sector, which is wholly sub-
ject to• market forces, indicate that the government's influence has increased
rather than moderated instability in residential building itself? If so, to
what extent is the more unstable performance attributable to legislative
inhibitions in the form of rigid maximum interest rates on government-
underwritten loans, which, if held below competitive levels, can act as un-
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intended selective credit controls in disfavor of housing? What are the
proper and practicable aims of adjusting the administration of the federal
housing programs to general cyclical fluctuations?
The reader must be forewarned that this attempt to analyze policy issues
is an "essay" in the literal meaning of the word, that is, an experimental
effort. To isolate the net effects of public policies from the multitude of
forces acting simultaneously on a complex economy or any of its major sec-
tors is always difficult if not impossible.2 The evidence will be incomplete
and the methodology imperfect. Moreover, even a conscientious attempt at
objective analysis will leave room for varying interpretations of what evi-
dence there is. In some cases, it may be impossible to furnish, clear-cut
answers. In others, only preliminary judgments which are subject to further
research can be formulated. Standards for measuring the performance of
public policies are as yet poorly developed and depend largely on widely
varying views on the goals of such policies. No matter how unequal it may
be to the task, however, economic research must address itself to an appraisal
of policies if it is to promote better understanding of important public issues
and enhance the prospect of more satisfactory solutions. The essay is offered
as a modest contribution to this objective.
Only as much of the market developments i,n housing and mortgage
finance between 1953 and 7957 will be discussed as seems essential for an
appraisal of housing credit policies.8 For the same purpose, it is necessary to
sketch the relative importance of the housing sector in the national economy
and describe the magnitude of the federal housing credit programs, as well
as their role in the housing and financial markets.
The Housing Sector and Its Federal Aid Programs—Some Orders
of Magnitude
Private residential construction expenditures during the period 1953-1957
averaged $16.5billiona year, or 4.76 per cent of the gross national product
and nearly 30 per cent of fixed private domestic investment. They about
'Cf. R. J. Saulnier, "An Appraisal of Selective Credit Controls," American Eco-
nomic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting, May 7952.
For more comprehensive historical analyses of housing and mortgage market devel-
opments during the postwar period, see Saul B. Klaman, The Postwar Reside ntia
Mortgage Market (Princeton for National Bureau of Economic Research, in press),
and Jack M. Guttentag, "Some Studies of the Post-World War II Residential Con-
struction and Mortgage Markets" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia Uni-
versity, 1958). Both studies were very helpful in the preparation of this essay. Cf. also
the papers by Saul B. Kiaman, James J. O'Leary, and Warren L. Smith in Study of
Mortgage Credit, Subcommittee on Housing of the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, December 22,1958.The papers, which be-
came available after the draft of this essay was completed, deal with postwar housing
credit policies as well as housing and mortgage market developments.
5Introduction
equaled the total amount spent by consumers on automobiles and parts,
two-thirds of the business expenditures on "producers' durable equipment,"
and more than half of the aggregate spending by state and local govern-
TABLE 1
Private Housing Starts under FHA and V.A. Programs Compared with Total
Private Housing Starts, 1946-1957
(thousand permanent nonfarm dwelling units)
Starts
under FHAV.A. Starts under GovernmentGovern-StartsStarts Programs ment Pro-as Peras Per TotalConven- grams asCent of Cent of
Yearrrivatetional
PerCent ofTotalTotal Starts °Startsb
TotalPri-StartsStarts
TotalFHA V.A.vate Starts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1946 662.5510.5 d152.0 69.0 83.0 d 23 10 13 d
1947 845.6405.6 d440.0 229.0 211.0 d 52 27 25 a
1948 913.5517.5 d396.1 294.1 102.0 d 44 32 12 d
1949 988.8520.Od468.8 363.8 105.0d 47 36 lid
19501,352.2665.5 686.7 486.7 200.0 d 51 36 15 d
19511,020.1607.9412.2 263.5 148.7 40 26 15
19521,068.5647.3 421.2 279.9 141.3 39 26 13
19531,068.3659.7 408.6 252.0 156.6 38 24 15
19541,201.7618.4 583.3 276.3 307.0 49 23 26
19551,309.5639.9 669.6276.7 392.9 51 21 30
19561,093.9633.9 460.0 189.3 270.7 42 17 25
1957 992.8696.1 296.7 168.4 128.3 30 17 13
SouRcz: Housing Statistics, Housing and Home Finance Agency.
°Bureau of Labor Statistics.
bStartsnot financed under federal government programs.
Reported by the agencies on the basis of first compliance inspections. For details, see
"FHA—V.A. Series and the Housing Market," Construction Review, June 1957.
Estimates of the Housing and Home Finance Agency given in Housing Stati.ctics,
July 1954, based on V.A. estimates of the number of units started which were later financed
with V.A. first mortgage loans. During the first few years of the V.A. program, there were
no compliance inspections which would have furnished a firm basis for determining housing
starts under the program, and no statistics on units started under V.A. inspection were
collected until about mid-1950. Consequently, the 1946-1950 data in columns 5, 6, and 8
are less reliable than those for the later years.
Because of rounding, components in columns 7 and 8 do not necessarily add up
to the totals in column 6.
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TABLE 2
FHA and V.A. Home Loans Made Compared with Total Nonfarm Mortgage




























































































































aEstimatesof mortgage recordings by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Data on
government-underwritten home loans from records of the Federal Housing Administra-
tion and Veterans Administration. The estimates of mortgage recordings include nonfarm
mortgages on small nonresidential property as well as mortgages on homes, and they
exclude mortgages on homes exceeding $20,000. Nevertheless, the data indicate ap-
proximate orders of magnitude.
b Because of rounding the FHA and V.A. components do not necessarily addup to the
totals.
rnents.4 They accounted for nearly two-fifths of aggregate expenditures for
new construction and exceeded substantially the investment in public con-
struction of all types. The residential mortgage debt at the end of 1957
represented 16.7 per cent of the total net debt, private and public, and 26.7
per cent of the private debt alone. The net flow of funds into the residential
mortgage market, totaling billion from ito 1957, equaled nearly
one-third of the total net flow of. funds into all types of debt instruments and
Total spending on new housing, including land and consumer durables furnished
with new dwellings but not captured in construction expenditure data, however, is
substantially larger than the amount of residential construction expenditures alone.
7introduction
approximated the combined net increase in long-term corporate and state
and local government debt during this period.5
The federal credit programs have a massive rather than marginal influ-
ence on the housing and mortgage markets. Moreover, they loom large in the
aggregate of all federal credit programs. By far the most important of these
operations is the underwriting of residential mortgage loans by the Federal
Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration. From to
1957, nearly 2.4 million dwelling units, or 42 per cent of all privately
financed units, were started under these programs (Table z). The great
year-to-year variations in the share of government-underwritten starts, which
exceeded one-half of the total in 1955 and was less than 30 per cent in i
will engage our attention later. Government-underwritten home loans made
during this period, i.e. loans on i- to 4-family houses, totaled $36 billion and
equaled about 30 per cent of the amount of all nonfarm mortgages of
$20,oOO or less that were recorded (Table 2). The volume of home loans
guaranteed by the Veterans Administration between 1953 and 1957 and, for
that matter, during most of the postwar period exceeded by far the volume
insured by the Federal Housing Administration.6
The government-underwritten residential mortgage debt at the end of
1957 stood at $51.6billion,or 42.6 per cent of the total debt of this type,
and it exceeded the indebtedness of all state and local governments corn-
For GNP and types of expenditures, see U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S.
Income and Output, November 1958. For debt estimates, see Survey of Current Busi-
ness, May 1958. Estimates of the residential mortgage debt through 1956 are from
Saul B. Kiaman, The Volume of Mortgage Debt in the Postwar Decade, Technical
Paper iNationalBureau of Economic Research, 1958. The preliminary estimate
for 1957wasfurnished by the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System. For data
for the first ten postwar years, see Kiaman, op. cit. Estimates for earlier periods are
given in Leo Grebler, David Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in Resi-
dential Real Estate, Princeton for National Bureau of 'Economic Research, 1956.
°Differencesin the share of the government programs in housing starts and in the
volume of mortgage lending are caused largely by the greater use of government-
underwritten financing in new construction compared to transactions involving exist-
ing property. The difference between the loan "insurance" offered by the Federal
Housing Administration and the "guaranty" offered by the Veterans Administration
for loans to eligible veterans is largely technical. PHA insurance covers the entire
amount of the loan but not all of the lender's expense that may result from default
and foreclosure, and the lender obtains FHA debentures for the amount of his claim
rather than cash. The V.A. guaranty currently is limited to 6o per cent of the loan
and in no event exceeds $7,500,butprovides for simpler liquidation procedures in
case of default or foreclosure, and the lender's claim is paid in cash. For a statement
by the Veterans Administration on the differences between the FHA and V.A. con-
tract, see Mortgage Interest Rate Problems, Hearings before the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, January 28, 1953.Inthe context of
this paper, the terms "government-underwritten" and "government-insured" loans are
used to encompass both FHA-insured and V.A.-guaranteed mortgages. Also, "FHA
loans" and "V.A. loans" refer to loans insured or guaranteed by the agencies.'
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TABLE 3
Government-Underwritten Residential Mortgage Debt Compared with Total
























































































































































































































SouRcE: For government-underwritten loans: Federal Housing Administration and
Veterans Administration.
For total home mortgage debt: Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
For total residential mortgage debt: 1946-1956: Kiaman, The Volume of Mortgage Debt
in the Postwar Decade; 1957: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System.
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bined. Its net increase of $22billionduring the period 1953-1957accounted
for more than two-fifths of the rise in the total residential mortgage debt
(Table 3) and 17.8 per cent of the expansion in the aggregate private debt.
Because the government programs operate mainly in the market for owner-
occupied single-family houses, the share of the government-underwritten
home mortgage debt in the total debt of this type is even greater. At the
end of 1957, government-underwritten home mortgage loans outstanding
represented nearly 44 per cent of the entire home mortgage debt. The
amount of these loans, $47 billion, exceeded total consumer indebtedness
other than that on mortgages. The net flow of funds into government-
underwritten home loans during the '953-1957 period averaged about
billiona year (Table 3)
Thebasic legislation for veterans' home loans prescribes maximum interest
rates and maximum loan maturities. These terms have been modified from
time to time by amendments, but veterans' home loans under the law have
always been permitted to cover up to 100percent of the "reasonable value"
of the property established by V.A.—the no-down-payment loan being one
of the prime benefits that the G.L Bill of Rights sought to confer upon
veterans. In the case of FHA, legislation prescribes maximum loan-to-value
ratios as well as maximum loan maturities and interest rates. Both FHA and
V.A., however, have administrative discretion to set lower interest rates and
require larger down payments or shorter maturities than the statutes permit,
not only for individual loans but for all transactions.8 Both agencies have
established procedures under which operative builders, upon approval of
their plans, can obtain loan insurance commitments (FHA) or "certificates
of reasonable value" (V.A.), have their projects inspected during construc-
tion, and sell homes to eligible purchasers with insured or guaranteed loans.
These commitments help builders to obtain short-tçrm construction financ-
ing and have become strategic instruments in the large-scale production and
marketing of homes for owner occupancy.
The most important general characteristic of the government-underwritten
mortgage is its high loan-to-value ratio and its long maturity compared to
TIna broad sense, the federal involvement in residential financing is even larger
than that revealed in the share of FHA and V.A. loans in the residential mortgage
debt. The Veterans Administration has made direct home loans to veterans, and the
Public Housing Administration and the Urban Renewal Administration have made
loans to local public agencies. Moreover, the federal government insures accounts in
savings and loan associations which hold conventional residential mortgages as their
principal asset, and it insures deposits in commercial and mutual savings banks which
together hold a considerable proportion of their assets in residential mortgages.
• Apparent earlier doubts about the V.A. Administrator's authority to require down
payments across the board were removed in July 1955whena minimum down pay-
ment of 2percent was required by regulation. While this action was criticized in
and out of Congress, there is no evidence that its legality was ever seriously questioned.
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the "conventional," i.e. uninsured, mortgage. It is this characteristic that
has made the government-underwritten loan a significant factor in the post-
war extension of home ownership to moderate-income families. Another
important characteristic is the easier marketability of loans insured or guar-
anteed by the federal government compared to conventional loans. As
a consequence, an active and nation-wide "secondary mortgage market" has
developed for government-underwritten loans, in which mortgage origina..
tors, usually mortgage companies, sell loans to permanent investors (or
portfolio lenders), such as life insurance companies and mutual savings
banks, and in which permanent investors can dispose of their holdings.9
Other federal housing credit programs with which this essay is concerned
aim at improving the marketability of residential mortgages or the liquidity
position of mortgage lenders and at augmenting the flow of funds into resi-
dential mortgages. One of the two agencies performing these functions is
the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), which buys, sells, and
holds government-underwritten loans. This Association, established in 1938
to provide an organized secondary market facility for FHA-insured loans and
authorized in 1948 to act likewise for V.A. -guaranteed loans, was wholly
financed by the federal government until 1954. In order to restrain the at
times intensive use of this governmental credit facility and to secure the
participation of private capital in its operations, the Housing Act of i
provided a new charter for the Association. Its operations were segregated
into three sectors:(i) management and liquidation of the then existing
mortgage portfolio of about $2.5 billion plus more than $700 million in out-
standing purchase and commitment contracts; (2) secondary market func-
tions; and (3) special assistance functions.
The secondary market operations were designed to provide market support
only at a price that would discourage excessive use of the facility. Purchases
were to be made at the going market price rather than at par, which was
the practice before the new charter; and sellers of loans to FNMA were
required to buy FNMA common stock equal to 3 per cent of the amount of
the loans. Also, there were to be no advance commitments for the purchase
of loans, which had previously been authorized from time to time and had
in effect converted the Association into a primary source of funds. The
special assistance operations were to continue a function previously per-
formed by FNMA, that is, the purchase of certain classes of government-
underwritten loans which the private market, because of unusual risks or
In contrast to the "primary mortgage market" in which transactions occur between
lenders and borrowers, transactions in the "secondary market" are made between
different types of lenders. For a more refined definition and detailed analysis of these
markets, see Kiaman, The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market, Chapter 7. For the
operations of mortgage companies, cf. Saul B. Klaman, Postwar Rise of Mortgage
Companies, Occasional Paper 6o, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959.
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lack of familiarity with a new type of security or for other reasons, might
be unwilling to accept. Sellers of loans falling in this category need not buy
FNMA stock, and FNMA could continue to make advance commitments
for the purchase of special assistance mortgages. But the amount authorized
for this function was strictly limited.
In addition, the Federal National Mortgage Association in 1954 was given
access to the private capital market by authority to issue nonguaranteed
debentures up to ten times its capital and surplus. To provide a "backstop,"
however, FNMA's authority for borrowing from the Treasury was continued,
and funds for the purchase of special assistance loans come exclusively from
the Treasury.1°
The fate of this effort to restrain the use of government credit will be seen
on subsequent pages. It suffices to say here that FNMA's total portfolio rose
from about $2.5billionat the time the new charter became operative to
nearly $4 billion at the end of 1957. At the latter date, the Association held
7.7 per cent of the amount of government-underwritten mortgage loans out-
standing, nearly 9 per cent of all V.A. loans outstanding, and almost 6 per
cent of the FHA-insured mortgage debt (Table 4). The net increase in the
FNMA portfolio between the end of 1954 and the end of '957 represented
about i o per cent of the net increase in the government-underwritten resi-
dential mortgage debt. Mortgage purchases by the Association in 1957 alone
equaled more than one-sixth of the gross amount of FHA and V.A. loans
made during that year, and its purchases of V.A. loans equaled more than
one-fifth of the amount of veterans' home loans closed (Tables 2andii).
Thus, the Federal National Mortgage Association has been a significant
factor in the market for government-underwritten mortgages and, indirectly,
in the residential mortgage market as a whole. In recent years, the Associa-
tion has also become an important user of funds in the capital market. Its
borrowings at the end of 1957 totaled $3.6 billion, of which $2.7 billion was
indebtedness to private investors while nearly $i billion was owed to the
Treasury. This distribution of FNMA obligations between the Treasury and
private holders represented a drastic shift from the pattern of the preceding
year when $2., billion was borrowed from the Treasury and less than $8oo
million from private investors (Table i8).
The other federal facility in this class is the Federal Home Loan Bank
System, which, through eleven regional banks, performs the functions of
bankers' banks for its member institutions, mostly savings and loan associa-
tions. The Home Loan Banks make loans to members to help them meet
unanticipated withdrawals of savings or seasonal mortgage loan demands
'°Forthe new FNMA charter, cf. Title III of the Housing Act of 1954(Public
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FNMA mortgage holdings: Federal National Mortgage Association. Govern-
ment-underwritten residential mortgage debt: Table 3, panel A, columns 2, 3, and 4.
Excluding a relatively small amount of mortgage loans transferred from the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation to FNMA in 1954.
in excess of the members' own funds, or to supplement local savings resources
in areas of rapid growth. They obtain money for these operations from
capital stock (now wholly owned by the members), from deposits by mem-
bers, and from nonguaranteed debentures and notes issued to private in-
vestors. The Treasury reviews and approves the timing, amount, and terms
of obligations issued by the banks and is authorized, as a "backstop" device,
to buy up to $i billion of their obligations, an authority that has remained
unused to date. Quite apart from formal arrangements, the coordination
of the banks' lending operations with general credit policies became one of
the critical issues in the management of governmental home-financing pro-
grams during 1955.
Advances outstanding of the Federal Home Loan Banks, relatively small
in the early postwar period, have reached a substantially higher level in
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recent years, paralleling the spectacular growth of savings and loan associa-
tions (Table 5). At the end of 1955, they totaled billion. Obligations
of the Federal Home Loan Banks have shown a corresponding increase and
rose to $975 million at the end of 1955. While borrowings from the banks
represent only a minor proportion of the total resources of member institu-
tions of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, they have at times been an
important factor in raising the mortgage lending potentials of the members.
During 1955, for example, the increase in advances made by the banks
equaled more than one-fifth of the increase in mortgage loans made by mem-
bers; in 1950, it equaled 27 per cent of the increase.
Although there are other major federal programs for assisting housing
and community development, the four activities sketched here have been in
the forefront of housing credit policies in recent years. These activities not
only have a significant impact on the housing, mortgage, and capital mar-
kets, but they also represent a very large sector of the aggregate of all federal
credit programs. FHA and V.A. loans outstanding at the end of the fiscal
TABLE 5
Federal Home Loan Bank Advances, Obligations of the Federal Home Loan Banks,




































































































SouRcE: Housing Statistics, and Savings and Home Financing Source Book, Federal Home
Loan Bank Board.
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year 1957accountedfor 92percent of all loans insured or guaranteed by
the federal government. The holdings of the Federal National Mortgage
Association, combined with direct home loans to veteransand ancillary
mortgage and real estate investments by FHA and V.A., accounted for about
one-fifth of the outstandings of all federal loans and financial investments,
including those for agriculture, business, and economic aid programs abroad.12
Thus, the federal involvement in the housing and related financial markets
is large both in absolute terms and in relation to total home building and
mortgage lending and to the aggregate of federal credit programs. The
special position of housing that these figures illustrate has had significant
implications for economic stabilization policies in recent years.
il Thesewere authorized in 1950, and most of the loans have been made in remote
areas where private lending facilities are held to be inadequate for investment in
low-interest home mortgage loans.
Special Analysis E of the Budget of the United States Government for the fiscal
year ending June 30,1959, Table4. The percentages would be still larger if federal
loans under other programs such as public housing, urban renewal, and college hous-
ing were included.
'5